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in Bangladesh: The
management and
involvement of local actors

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Key Words: Rohingya, Bangladesh, Humanitarian operations, 4W data, Localization

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The Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh: Management and the involvement of local actors

Abstract

Since August 2017, more than 700000 Rohingya seek refuge in Bangladesh from neighboring Myanmar that resulted in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. However little is known about the humanitarian operations of the Government of Bangladesh and humanitarian bodies in the management of this crisis. This article aims to fill this gap. It provides a profile of organizations in relation to the Rohingya refugee crisis which will serve a baseline for any future research. The article analyzes the 4W data of the UNOCHA and provides an evaluation of humanitarian operators and involvement of various actors. Segregation of humanitarian operators by National and International NGOs suggests that the humanitarian operations are still dominated by international actors and localization i.e. a greater involvement of the Bangladeshi actors is yet to be achieved.

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1. Introduction

The influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to neighboring Bangladesh has resulted in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. The recent official estimate of managing agencies identified more than 1.2 Million people in need (JRP 2019) including more than 9 hundred thousand refugees and about 3 hundred thousand from the host communities.

Though the recent exodus of Rohingya people from Myanmar has received attention and international media coverage, the Rohingyas have been seeking refuge in Bangladesh for the last five decades. The notable years when a major influx happened are 1978, 1992, 2012, 2016 and recently 2017 (Bowden. 2018; Parnini 2013; Parnini et al. 2013, Anwary, 2019). The background and the history of persecution have been analyzed in a number of works e.g. Ibrahim (2016), Wade (2017), Parnini (2013), Parnini et al (2013), Dussish (2018) and Anwary (2019). However, the unprecedented influx of 2017 surprised everybody. Wencel at el. (2018) mentioned that at one point daily arrivals per day were up to 12,500.

The crisis called for a significant endeavor from the Government of Bangladesh and humanitarian agencies for the provision and overall management of the humanitarian activities. Unfortunately, little is known about this endeavor. The authors observe that until now the management of the Rohingya refugee crisis has received little attention of the academic literature. This observation is also true for the other refugee crises around the world.

This article generates a profile of the humanitarian operations for the overall management of the crisis and analyzes its evolution over time. By doing so, we address a significant gap, as stated in the previous paragraph, in the literature of the Rohingya refugee crisis and the refugee crisis in general, thereby provide a baseline for future research.

As the 2017 crisis is relatively new, it is understandable that the academic literature is still to catch up. However, even the management of the pre-2017 crisis has not been addressed adequately in academic literature. In addition, in non-academic arenas, the management of the crisis seldom receives any attention. The attention there has been overwhelmingly on the issues related to repatriation and relocation (Reliefweb 2019, Guardian 2018, Reuter 2018). A notable exception in this regard is a special issue on the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh by Humanitarian Exchange Magazine of the Overseas Development Institute (<https://odihpn.org/>) from which we have cited Bowden (2018), Crisp (2018) and Wencel et al (2018). Shevach et al. (2018) from the same issue of humanitarian exchange also covered responses within the first 100 days. A recent article by Lewis (2019) covered the initial stages of operation and can be regarded as one of the first serious attempts to document the humanitarian management in response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Except these attempts no other attempts have been observed that document the management of humanitarian efforts in respect of the Rohingya refugee crisis. This article originates from the need to fill this gap and improve the understanding of the refugee camp management.

Currently, the humanitarian management involves providing humanitarian assistance to more than a million people in the refugee and host communities. This population is equal to a medium sized city and even larger than some countries. It is impossible to capture the process of management in a single article and we do not aim for it. The aim of this article is a profiling of the humanitarian organizations involved in the Rohingya refugee crisis management which can serve as a base line for future research. In a separate piece of research the authors of this article interviewed several project managers involved with projects related to the camp. One observation came out of that research is the tension between national and international NGOs in assuming leadership roles in humanitarian operations. This observation also has a basis in the UN declaration 2016 (UNHCR 2016) which called for engaging a wide range of stakeholders including local operators. Therefore, in this article we also wanted to capture the extent that management of the humanitarian operations has engaged a wide range of stakeholders and to what extent the host agencies from the host country were involved i.e. the degree of localization. Regarding the involvement of the local agencies it is understandable that, in the early stages of the crisis, many might have lacked experience compared to the international humanitarian bodies, hence initial involvement of local agencies is expected to be low. However, with the progress of time they are expected to gain experiences resulting in increased involvement. Therefore, one may wonder if the involvement in a humanitarian operation as severe as the Rohingya refugee crisis allowed these agencies from the Bangladesh to gain experience and assume leadership roles. In this article we also aim to have a first look at this issue.

The research is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the history of the Rohingya refugee crisis and provide an overview of the present situation. This is followed by a review of literature of the Rohingya refugee crisis in the section Three. We then address the historical involvement of humanitarian bodies in Bangladesh in the context of the Rohingya refugee crisis in the section Four. The section also lists the NGOs currently

and previously involved in humanitarian operations and thereby develops a good baseline for future research and policy debates. The Fifth section discusses the coordination mechanism of humanitarian activities, looking at both the coordination by the Government of Bangladesh and NGOs. In the Sixth section we look at the 4W dataset which is used to report the activities of the humanitarian operation and we compare the statistics to understand the evolution of humanitarian operations. The section also analyzes the data of humanitarian actors by type which allows us to address the question of localization. The paper concludes in section Seven by summarizing the findings and identifies future directions for research.

2. History of the Rohingya refugee crisis

The Rohingya people are an ethnic minority of the Rakhine state of Myanmar. However, Myanmar does not recognize the Rohingya as one of the ethnic groups and citizens of the country. The Rohingya refugee crisis is mainly the result of denial of the rights and consistent persecution of Rohingya in Myanmar. This background and context of the crisis have been explained and documented in a number of books and articles e.g. Ibrahim (2016), Wade (2017), Parnini (2013), Parnini et al. (2013), Dussish (2018) and Anwary (2019). Ibrahim (2016) is specifically notable for debunking ideas regarding the origin of Rohingya and established the existence of the Rohingya community before the British occupation of the colonial Myanmar from the 18th century. Dussish (2018) very nicely provides a timeline of the historical contexts leading the present-day crisis. As the timeline of Dussish (2018) shows, in 1948 Burma, renamed as Myanmar in 2010, received independence from British colonial rule. Violent conflicts broke out among various ethnic groups of Burma. This started the waves of internal displacement and exoduses of various ethnic groups which has continued to the present day. This period also observed the first incidence of non- recognition of the Rohingya as one of the 135 ethnic groups which are called the National Races of Myanmar and they were also prevented from acquiring documents for citizenship (Ibrahim, 2016). This eventually paved the way for the denial of citizenship in the future. 1962 is another turning point as Burma came under military dictatorship and widespread persecution of the Rohingya community resulted in Rohingya diaspora to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, UAE, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia (Dussish 2018) in addition to Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). They were officially made stateless in 1982 with a Citizenship Act. Under the Act, those who belong to one of the so-called 135 ‘national races’ are full citizens, particularly those who lived in Myanmar prior to 1823. Rohingya were not allowed to be in this category as they were not classified as one of the national races after the independence in 1948. The other way of achieving citizenship required providing ‘conclusive evidence’ of residence before independence in 1948. The Rohingya population did not have that ‘conclusive evidence’ caused by non-issuance of the citizenship documents (Ibrahim, 2016) after the independence in 1948. The Rohingya people became stateless as a consequence of the Citizenship Act.

In 1971 Bangladesh gained independent from Pakistan. 1978 saw the first major influx of Rohingya into Bangladesh. In February 1978, the Burmese military junta launched a large-scale operation named the ‘Operation Dragon King’ (Naga-Min). The operation led to mass killing and expulsion of over 200,000 to Bangladesh from Rakhine. Many of them

returned to Myanmar in subsequent years for reasons well documented in an UNHCR report (Lindquist 1979). Another major influx took place in 1992 where again 250,000 Rohingya came to Bangladesh. Lastly in 2012 riots broke out in Rakhine between Buddhists and Muslims which resulted in internal displacements for the both communities and Rohingya, as in the past, came to Bangladesh seeking refuge.

On August 25, 2017 following an alleged attack on police check post by a militant Rohingya group a major crack down on the Rohingya communities took place. This resulted in an unprecedented influx of Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh. Unlike the previous influxes which did not receive widespread attention (Gartel, 2013) the post august 2017 crisis did not escape the attention of the international media. It should be however noted that, the gravity of the crisis makes it significantly different from the previous exodus from Myanmar. Lindquist (1979) mentioned that the influx of 1978 is comparable to that of the Vietnamese boat people to Malaysia. The crisis since 2017 is of a significantly greater magnitude than 1978 or any other happened in past. The present crisis has unfolded at a speed and on a scale that is unprecedented in human history.

Table 1 below shows that on the 24th September, 2017 new entrants since 25th August 2017 were 436,000 and by the 31 Dec. 2018 the number is 745,000. On average it shows 145,33 entries per day which is significantly higher than reported by Wencel et al. (2018). The total number of refugees, including refugees remaining from the previous influxes, is estimated to be about nine hundred thousand. The official statistics maintained by OCHA still show increases in the refugee population every month, which to a large extent caused by new births.

Table 1: Entry of Rohingya refugees by date since August 2017

Date	Population
24 th September, 2017	436,000
15 th October, 2017	537,000
26 th November, 2017	624,000
30 th July, 2018	706,000
12 th Nov. 2018	733,415
31 st Dec. 2018	745,000

Source: Compiled from Situation reports (Various dates)

The causes of this unprecedented influx are unknown because independent verifiers have not been allowed to visit Rakhine in those early days. Those who have watched this humanitarian crisis unfold in the media and from the ground have seen smoke rising in Myanmar that was visible from the Bangladesh side of the border. The satellite images also showed evidence of burning/destruction of Rohingya villages in the Rakhine. Most refugees arrived in Bangladesh in extremely destitute conditions. An aid worker mentioned to the authors that the Rohingya had to travel for between 8 and 22 days to arrive in Bangladesh. Accurate information is not available because, as already mentioned, Myanmar authorities did not allow any independent bodies to investigate and document what happened.

The Rohingya refugee crisis of 2017 is unparalleled in human history and will require a unique explanation within the forced migration literatures (See Etienne 2018 for a recent

survey of the literature of forced migration). This paper does not attempt such an explanation but does strongly point to a need for such a study.

3. Existing literature on the Rohingya refugee crisis

The Rohingya refugee crisis has a long history but only started to receive the deserved global attention since the crisis of 2017. In general, interest in refugee crises has become noticeable outside of the traditional fields such as sociology, history, geography only since the Syrian refugee crisis¹ of 2015. However, non-traditional fields such as economics and management literature are still to adequately address the refugee crisis scenarios including the Rohingya refugee crisis.

Most of the research available of the Rohingya refugee crisis is based on previous influxes, with attention given to the history, condition of the refugees and repatriation. As mentioned earlier, a detailed history of the Rohingya refugee crisis with in depth analysis of the internal situation in Myanmar is available in books and article such as Ibrahim (2016), Wade (2017), Parnini (2013), Parnini et al. (2013). Dussish (2018) and Anwary (2019) provided coverage of some issues relevant to the recent crisis.

A number of studies wanted to document the experiences of the Rohingya refugees. Cheung (2012) compared the experiences of Rohingya who fled in the early 1990s to Bangladesh and Malaysia and identified that refugees develop their own protection strategies and livelihood mechanisms outside the boundaries of formal asylum enabling them to develop own protection spaces and a level of de facto integration. Ullah (2011) conducted interviews of 134 refugees from Kutupalong and Nayapara camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh and, utilizing both qualitative and quantitative approaches, identified the level of abuse and persecution, and shed some light on repatriation. Kyaw (2017) on the other hand addressed the question of statelessness of the Rohingya and the role of the Citizenship Act of the Myanmar government. Alam (2001) looked at the issue of stateless of the Rohingya and identified that the minority status of Rohingya in Myanmar has been constructed concurrently with the rise of Burmese nationalism, with the ethnic divisions in Myanmar playing a significant role. Rahman (2010) addressed the security dilemma faced by Bangladesh in the context of the Rohingya refugees. They argued that the crisis was a potential threat to Bangladesh's internal stability and was challenging for Bangladesh to find a solution that fulfilled the national interests and supported the humanitarian activities.

The impact of the crisis on bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar was again addressed by Parnini (2013) and Parnini et al. (2013) . They also looked the local and international responses to address and resolve the Rohingya problems with specific emphasis on repatriation agreements taken place after the previous influxes. Palmer (2011) carried out

¹ We have seen a good number of recent papers within the economic discipline. E.g. Tumen (2016), Hatton (2016). Joakim (2019), Dustmann et al. (2019), Dustmann et al. (2018), Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018), Ifikhar and Zaharieva (2019), Benesch et al. (2019). It should be noted that the focus of this literature is still very much the Syrian refugee crisis and the impacts in Europe.

research on Islamic Relief's relief programme using fieldwork on the Rohingya refugees to explore the added value of employing Muslim aid agencies. They did not find clear evidence that being 'Muslim' facilitates easy and effective relations between an organisation and beneficiaries, an organisation and a host country, or between organisations. Kipgen (2013) studied the situations in the Rakhine state to identify the issues related to reducing ethnic conflicts. They suggested that the Rakhine and Rohingya need to be willing to compromise on their differences by recognizing and respecting each other's identity and culture and the Myanmar government and the general public must be ready to embrace the Rohingya population if any genuine reconciliation is to be realized.

Crabtree (2010) studied the coping mechanism of refugees as relief decreases over time with protracted displacement. Based on interviews with Rohingya, the work showed that, despite of having no legal right to work, nearly every refugee household was engaged in multiple forms of wage-earning employment. The role of the United Nations and the international community in establishing criteria for the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar from Bangladesh was examined by Saha (2000). This study highlights the importance of the international community in establishing standards and supporting the return. Korkut (2018) evaluated Turkey's position itself as a humanitarian actor though involvement in both Syrian and Rohingya refugee crises.

It is clear from the above literature review that so far the attention has been on understanding the causes of the refugee crisis, conditions in the refugee camps, bilateral relationship and repatriation possibilities. However, the refugee camp management has not been addressed explicitly in the literature. It is in general missing in the refugee crisis literature though we have seen a small number of such papers. For example there are papers on the management of supply chain in humanitarian context (Abidi et al., 2014) and organizing refugee camps (Chaux et al. 2018). However the literature in this regard is rather scarce and we have not seen any paper with detailed profiling of management of the Rohingya refugee camps. A notable exception is a recent work by Lewis (2019) which sheds and documents the responses of Government and humanitarian bodies at the initial stages of the crisis.

4. Historical contexts and current involvement of humanitarian agencies

The beginning of the modern humanitarianism can be traced back to the establishment of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863 (Davey et al., 2013; Gartell, 2019). From the establishment of the ICRC up to the first World War is considered as the first period of modern humanitarianism. The activities of that period were predominantly shaped by needs of countries of the Western Hemisphere. Several NGOs followed the footsteps of ICRC in the pre-second world war era and the idea of international government emerged at this time. The period after Second World War saw a proliferation of the humanitarian activities. Notable in this period is the establishment of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movements of Migrants from Europe (PICMME). The PICMME later evolved into

International organization for Migration (IOM) and is now a UN agency. NGOs that became prominent in this period are World Council of Churches (WCC), Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Lutheran World Relief and NCWC. The other NGOs that later came and rose into prominence and have since become global brands are MSF, Oxfam, Save the Children and World Vision. MSF specifically contributed in engaging in humanitarian activities independent of government intervention (Gartell, 2019). Independence from the government intervention is now at the core of activities of the humanitarian organizations.

UNHCR formed in December 1950 and the Europe was the principal area of refugee concerns (Loescher, 2017). In 1951 the refugee convention was adopted and has since been ratified by 145 countries (UNHCR 2019). The major refugee movement concerning the humanitarian activities during that time was the refugee movement during the Cold War from the Communist Eastern Europe to the Democratic Western Europe. The institution gradually expanded their operations into the developing countries. The most significant assistance provided by UNHCR to the developing countries at this stage was medical assistance to the Algerian refugees who fled to Tunisia. During 1960 and 70, the operations of UNHCR extended into Africa as the Western governments, led by the United States, considered that instability in the South might give rise to communist regimes. Western governments accordingly showed willingness to finance operations in Africa and Asia. This coincided with a reduced need to finance refugee operations in Europe. The UNHCR was originally created as a small office of 33 persons and expanded incrementally over decades and by 31 October 2016 the Office had 16,765 staff located in 135 countries (Loescher 2017).

UNHCR first became involved with Bangladesh by providing support to the refugees from Bangladesh in the Indian camps during the liberation war of 1971. In 1978, at the request of the Government of Bangladesh, UNHCR became involved with the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (Lindquist 1979). UNHCR's long international involvement and mandate (UNHCR, 2019) shaped the way it involves with humanitarian activities in Bangladesh. UNHCR was involved in humanitarian activities in 1978 and the subsequent crises in 1992 and 2012. The organisation actively participated in humanitarian activities and, somewhat controversially, in repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar (Crisp, 2018; Saha, 2000; Parnini, 2013, Lindquist, 1979). Lindquist (1979) reports specifically portrayed a negative picture of the parties involved with humanitarian activities and repatriation of refugees to Myanmar. UNHCR withdrew itself temporarily from Bangladesh following disputes concerned with the repatriation of refugees after 1992 (Parnini 2013).

In recent times, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is seen to be getting more engaged with the refugee crisis. IOM is more focused on international migration instead of refugees as reflected in its mandate (IOM 2019). In contrast, UNHCR is primarily mandated to provide international protection and humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 2019). As mentioned earlier, IOM was established in 1951 separately from the UN as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), and was not incorporated into the UN family until 2016 and named the UN Migration Agency (Bradley, 2017). Currently it has over 10,100 staff in 471 locations and is as large as UNHCR. The involvement of IOM in management of the Rohingya refugee crisis was limited until 2013. However, the organisation is taking a prominent role in the management of the recent Rohingya refugee crisis. IOM, along with UNHCR, is jointly responsible for

managing humanitarian operations and considered as the lead agency for overseeing the activities (Bowden 2018).

The Rohingya refugee crisis has attracted many humanitarian organizations to operate in Bangladesh. We present a brief list in Table 2 and the full list in the Appendix Table 2A. The Table 2 shows the classification of NGOs by origin and religion and 4 types of organizational involvement. They are International NGOs (INGOs), National NGOs (NNGOs), UN, GoB and others/Consortium. We have classified the organizations that originated in Bangladesh as NNGOs although they may have international operations. International NGOs are those who originated abroad though may have permanent presence in Bangladesh. The UN classification implies the organization belongs to the UN family. We have a classification as others/consortium for 2 organizations that do not fit into any of the previous three classifications. There are total 172 organizations listed in the table who have worked in the camp in various stages. Of these, 91 are INGOs and 66 are NNGOs. We wanted to be as accurate as possible in the classification and listing, though some other organizations may also be involved that we have been unable to identify and are not included in the list. Furthermore, it should be noted that differentiation between INGOs and NNGOs is not always clear cut and therefore some classifications were difficult and may be open to alternative interpretations.

Table 2 also categorises the entities by religion. It is noted that many organizations are not religious based entities and within the religion-based entities a good mix can be observed. Out of 172 bodies 27 can be categorised as religion based i.e. less than 20%, and this implies that religion does not play a prominent role in the humanitarian operations.

Table 2: Humanitarian actors by type and religion

Type	No	Religious orientation	Religion type
INGOs	91	22	Christian = 13, Muslim =9
NNGOs	66	5	Christian=1, Muslim=2, Hindu=1, Sikhs=1
UN	8	0	-
GoB	5	0	-
Others/Consortium	2	0	-
Total	172	27	Christian =14, Muslim=11, Hindu=1, Sikhs=1

It is also interesting to see that within religious NGOs, the Christian NGOs are featuring in a higher number than the Muslim NGOs though Rohingya are predominantly Muslims. It is also interesting to see that the percentage of religious NGOs are relatively low in for NNGOs compared to INGOs.

5. Rohingya Refugee Crisis Management Coordination Mechanisms

The Table 2 demonstrates that 172 institutions have participated in the humanitarian activities at various stages of the crisis. Involvement of so many institutions requires coordination and we discuss it in this section.

The humanitarian operations of the Rohingya refugee crisis have two components. One of it is administration and policing and the other one is humanitarian activities. The Government of Bangladesh is responsible for the administration and policing, while the humanitarian activities are conducted by the NGOs and are coordinated by an umbrella organisation called Inter Sector Coordination Group. The Joint Response Plan (JRP 2019) explains how the activities of the two bodies are organized, as set out below.


5A. Government of Bangladesh

In order to facilitate understanding of the structure of management by the Government of Bangladesh, we constructed the Figure 1 from the information provided by the Joint Response Plan 2019 (JRP, 2019). The Rohingya refugee crisis management is conducted by the Government on two levels. Level one is administered from the capital city Dhaka. The Ministries of the Government of Bangladesh together with the UN agencies in Dhaka form the National Task Force (NTF). The Ministries of Disaster Management and Relief is mandated by the NTF to oversee the refugee crisis related activities. Though the Rohingya refugee camps have significantly impacted the forest and environment of the surrounding area (Hassan et al. 2018) the Ministry of Environment and Forest is not prominently featured in the management. The agenda for rehabilitation and coordination was elaborated by the Government of Bangladesh in a meeting on the 14th September, 2017 following the visit by the Prime Minister to the camps on the 12th September 2017 (Government of Bangladesh, 2017). The meeting specifically allocated 2000 acres of land in Kutupalong for building shelters for the Rohingya families. This area has been now extended to more than 6000 acres.

The second level is the operations from the Cox's Bazar, the district where the Rohingya refugee camps are located. These activities are coordinated by the Office of Refugee, Relief and Repatriation (RRRC) headed by an Additional Secretary of the Government of Bangladesh (<https://rrrc.portal.gov.bd/site/page/b6b4b598-2d29-447b-b6ce-b844ca4470d2/About-office>). The office was established in 1992 following the establishment of 20 camps and a memorandum with the UNHCR and WFP.

Due to security concerns and fears for deterioration of law and order, the Armed Forces Division (AFD) is involved with the operation at both the national and regional levels. AFD are supported by the national Police and Border Guards. Access to camps is regulated and permissions are issued by the RRRC. Additionally, the local district and sub-district level administrations (Upajila Nirbahi Officers) are involved in this operation. RRRC appoints Camp in Charge (CiC) who are all mid ranked Government officers. The CiCs with the support from the armed forces, police and border guards and sub-district level administration oversee the administration of camps and relief operations.

Figure 1



Source: JRP 2019, Reconstructed by Authors.


5B. Humanitarian actors:

Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the humanitarian operations in relation to the Rohingya refugee crisis. As in the case of the management by the Government of Bangladesh, the humanitarian actors are also managed by as a two-level structure. The Strategic Executive Group in Dhaka oversees the humanitarian operations which is formed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the representatives from other UN bodies. IOM is regarded as the lead agency (Bowen 2018). The prominence of IOM started from 2014 when a strategy paper (Government of Bangladesh, 2014) specifically mentioned certain members of the UN country teams which excluded the UNHCR. The minutes from the 14th Sep. 2017 meeting as which initiated the formal management of the post August 2017 crisis showed increased role for IOM in the overall humanitarian management.

In Cox's Bazar, the Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) formed which works closely with the RRRC and the district level administration. Both National and International NGOs operate under the umbrella of ISCG. Any NGO operating in Bangladesh needs to be registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau of Bangladesh (<http://www.ngoab.gov.bd/>). The number of NGOs has varied over time, although the Joint Response Plan (JRP 2019)

identifies a total of 125 partners of various origins involved in delivering humanitarian services to refugees and 34 partner involved in the host communities by the end of 2018.

Figure 2:



Source: JRP 2019, reconstructed by Authors.

5C. The camp, sectors and 4W data

The majority of the Rohingya refugees live in a camp site commonly known as the Kutupalong camp. The population statistics of the Kutupalong camp and some other large camps of the world are given in the Table 3. As can be seen, the 2017 influx suddenly made the Kutupalong camp the most populated camp of the world which currently has more than 625 thousand refugees. In addition, many refugees live in nearby camps and the demarcation of them with the Kutupalong camp is not obvious. In total more than eight hundred thousand refugees live in the Kutupalong camp and the vicinities making this the biggest refugee area in the world by a large margin.

Table 3: Refugee camps population around the world

Camp name	Country	Population*
Kutupalong	Bangladesh	625,428
Bidi Bidi	Uganda	223,088
Palorinya	Uganda	118,404
Kayanwali	Uganda	76,717
Dadaab	Kenya	208,550
Kakuma	Kenya	186,001
Nyarugusu	Tanzania	134,696
Katumba	Tanzania	66416
Zaatari	Jordan	78,357
Pugnido	Ethiopia	66,429
Yida	Sudan	54684
Dzaleka	Malawi	34,000

*Data from 2015 to 2018, Source: UNHCR country pages. Note that some countries like Lebanon, Turkey and Pakistan have large refugee population however they are not confined in a small number of refugee camps.

Though commonly known as the Kutupalong camp, is divided in several camps for administrative purpose. The Refugee crisis related activities now cover 34 camps in 7 locations: Kutupalong, Chakmarkul, Unchiprang, Shamlapur, Leda, Ali Khali, Nayapara, Jadimura, Teknaf, Ukhia. Some refugees also live with within the host communities (Source: Based on ISCG Situation Report, 29th Nov. 2018)

Along with the refugees, affected host communities are included in the relief related operations. All the host community and refugee sites are highly vulnerable to rain, floods, cyclones, fire and landslides. Rohingya people are not allowed to participate in income generating activities affecting the national economy. Only a limited number of day-labourer jobs offered by the NGOs are available to Rohingya. The Rohingya therefore are entirely dependent on the humanitarian assistance provided by NGOs. Yearly estimates for humanitarian activities are made at the end of each year in the Joint Response Plan that is freely available online (JRP 2019).

Humanitarian activities are conducted across a wide range of sectors. Currently the activities are classed in 10 sectors and coordinated accordingly. The sector classifications and the need assessment made in the Joint Response Plan for 2019 are given below in Table 4.

Table 4: Sector-wise estimates of funding required in 2019

Sectors	Fund required (\$, in Million)	People in need (in Million)	People targeted
Food security	255	1.2	1.2 M

Wash	136.7	1.1	1.1 M
Shelter	128.8	1	1 M
Site Management	98.7	1.2	1.2 M
Health	88.7	1.2	1.2 M
Protection (Child Protection and Gender based violence)	85.9	1.2	1.2 M
Education	59.5	696,400	462,370
Nutrition	48.1	347,590	347,590
Communication with Communities*	11	1.2	1.2 M
Coordination*	4.2	N/A	N/A
Logistics*	2.8	N/A	N/A
Emergency (Tele communications)*	1.1	N/A	N/A
Total	920.5		

Source: Source: JRP (2019). Star marked are not sectors of operation.

The primary source of information regarding the activities of humanitarian organisations is the website managed by Humanitarian Response (<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en>) that works under the umbrella of the United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The data set is input through a mechanism called 4W. The 4W tool provides an inventory of reporting activities on WHO does WHAT, WHERE, WHEN that fall under the Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) framework. The earliest reporting date for the Rohingya refugee crisis is 22nd September, 2017. At the beginning of the recent crisis, the ISCG provides weekly updates of 4W data. The data is now published once every month.

6. Evolution of humanitarian operations in 4W Data

In this section we conduct an analysis of the 4W data that keep records of activities in relation to the Rohingya refugee crisis. The 4W data is available by activities within sectors. Some examples of activities are ‘25 KG Rice’, ‘Micronutrient powder (MNP) supplementation’, ‘Collecting, verifying and analyzing information and identify protection risks’ and ‘Distribution of hygiene kits’. The name of the program partner, implementing partner, donors, sectors and locations have been identified for each listed activity. The Tables 5 to 13 have been constructed using the 4W information. The leadership role in an activity is assumed by the program partner.

Construction of the tables involved significant amount of data cleaning. Notably for some activities we observed a number of missing values. For example, the name of the program partner has been included however the names of the implementing partner and donor are not. In these cases it has been assumed that the program partner is also the implementing partner and donor. Similar problems were encountered in extracting the information about activities. We assumed the sub-sector classification stated in the spreadsheet as the activity

name if the activity is not listed. Additionally, for some activities, names of a number of donors have been jointly mentioned. For example if the activity '25 KG Rice' has WFP and UNHCR than we assume that this activity has two donors. Extra care has been taken to identify the institutions that are known by different names.

Table 5: All sectors

All sectors	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Program Partners	22	37	53	65	86	98
Implementing partner	34	56	66	80	92	118
Donors	37	67	95	116	158	219
Sectors	8	9	10	10	10	10
Activities	147	195	207	310	268	220
Locations	60	109	97	88	88	109
No. of entries	913	2171	3732	6096	9864	13372

After the necessary cleaning of data, we have constructed tables from 5 to 15. The number of program partners, implementing partners, donors, sectors, activities, locations and entries are reported. It should be noted that the number of activities and locations are not comparable across various reporting dates because of changes in the reporting procedure.

The Table 5 shows the evolution of the involvement of organization over 6 report dates from 22nd Sep. 2017 to 5th March, 2019. The number of program partners reported in 22nd September was only 22, which increase to 98 in 5th March 2019. A similar rate of increase can be observed for the implementing partners which rose from 34 to 118. However, the number of donors has increased at a much faster rate, from 37 to 219. The table indicates that at the early period of the crisis the same organizations acted as both donor and implementing partner for the same activity. This apparently has changed though not a great extent in the later period. The statistics for locations and activities are not comparable as the reports have used different methods of classifications in different stages of the crisis. However significant change can be observed for the number of entries for activities, from 913 to 13372 (an increase of approximately 14.6 times). The number of implementing partners has multiplied by 3.5 over the same period. This shows an expansion of activities by a small number of institutions.

To facilitate a comparison of expansion of activities we also look at them by sectors, as presented in Tables 6 to 15. Note that protection and site management have not been reported as separate sectors in the initial period. As we have observed in the previous table, there was an expansion in the number of entries compared to the numbers of partners and donors. The highest growth of entries can be observed for the Wash sector that increased from 16 to 4251. Another sector that registered a very high growth rate of entries is the Child Protection sector. For this sector, the number of program and implementing partners roughly

doubled whereas entries increased tenfold. Interestingly in the Health sector there is a decrease in entries from 294 to 227.

Table 6: Child Centred Care/Child Protection

Child Centred Care/Child Protection	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme Partner	5	5	6	8	14	11
Implementing partner	7	9	6	8	25	15
Donors	7	8	5	8	16	20
Activities	22	38	14	16	14	29
Locations	23	142	16	15	34	39
No of entries	128	167	291	506	625	1184

Table 7: Education

Education	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme Partner	3	5	3	8	4	17
Implementing partner	7	9	6	10	6	23
Donors	6	10	6	7	12	63
Activities	22	33	20	14	14	26
Locations	12	17	18	30	38	47
No of entries	136	160	157	213	903	4195

Table 8: Food Security

Food Security	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme Partner	9	13	19	25	22	11
Implementing partner	9	15	23	29	24	19
Donors	9	14	36	45	20	13
Activities	8	25	50	80	11	2
Locations	18	23	26	31	30	30
No of entries	43	108	528	805	114	235

Table 9: Gender Based Violence (GBV)

Gender Based Violence (GBV)	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme	8	9	11	7	8	14

Partner						
Implementing partner	9	10	13	7	11	17
Donors	11	12	15	8	18	20
Activities	9	13	24	9	13	9
Locations	28	27	27	12	28	43
No of entries	101	121	241	81	335	988

Table 10: Health

Health	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme Partner	9	16	21	18	22	31
Implementing partner	9	16	22	27	19	30
Donors	9	12	23	23	36	30
Activities	28	27	38	92	87	46
Locations	17	20	27	25	37	36
No of entries	294	776	989	618	424	227

Table 11: NFI/Shelter

NFI/Shelter	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme Partner	9	12	23	24	33	31
Implementing partner	11	12	23	23	39	25
Donors	9	17	33	39	65	37
Activities	6	11	1	24	1	28
Locations	14	13	35	42	51	35
No of entries	35	44	555	2195	4013	1006

Table 12: Nutrition

Nutrition	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme Partner	4	5	6	10	15	8
Implementing partner	4	6	7	11	17	10
Donors	3	7	6	9	13	13
Activities	36	33	21	22	19	21
Locations	26	29	19	21	45	46
No of entries	294	363	332	448	431	507

Table 13: Protection

Protection	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme partner	N/A	2	2	5	6	4
Implementing partner	N/A	2	2	6	6	8
Donor	N/A	2	4	6	6	5
Activities	N/A	9	13	12	9	10
Locations	N/A	9	6	29	19	31
No of entries	N/A	49	50	76	177	240

Table 14: Site Management

Site Management	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme Partner	N/A	N/A	10	11	6	2
Implementing partner	N/A	N/A	10	10	6	46
Donors	N/A	N/A	10	9	6	2
Activities	N/A	N/A	1	10	5	7
Locations	N/A	N/A	14	34	33	34
No of entries	N/A	N/A	40	102	239	539

Table 15: WASH

Wash	22/09/2017	06/10/2017	10/11/2017	29/12/2017	18/06/2018	05/03/2019
Programme Partner	9	20	30	36	42	55

Implementing partner	11	24	33	37	42	54
Donors	9	27	41	47	75	104
Activities	16	11	25	31	63	42
Locations	34	71	53	34	63	94
No of entries	16	381	549	1050	2603	4251

6C. Comparing the participation of various humanitarian actors

Tables 5 to 15 provide a snap shot of the evolution of involvement of NGOs in the humanitarian activities in relation to the Rohingya refugee crisis. In this section we look in detail at NGO involvement, with specific emphasis on the question of localization, that is whether a greater involvement of the Bangladeshi NGOs in humanitarian activities can be observed. In order to provide an answer to this question we segregated the humanitarian actors into 5 categories:

- a. GoB = Implies the institutions from the Government of Bangladesh.
- b. INGO =International NGO. For the purpose of the representation we defined an NGO as international if it is originated outside of Bangladesh.
- c. NNGO = National NGO. An NGO is national if it is originated in Bangladesh.
- d. UN = United Nations.
- e. Others = Other bodies such as another country except Bangladesh.

To identify how the involvement of national NGOs in humanitarian activities have changed, we looked at two reporting dates: 22th September 2017 and 5th March 2019. At these two dates the program and implementing partners have been segregated according to the categories a-e identified above and are presented in Figures 3 to 13.

In the Figure 3, all sectors are combined. In the other figures the data has been segregated sector-wise. Figure 3 shows that the number and ratio (as a proportion of the total) of both national and international NGOs have gone up. For program partnership, the INGOs have gone up from 13 to 61 and NNGOs have gone up from 3 to 27. It shows an increase from 59% to 62% participation of INGOs. For NNGOs it shows an increase from 14% to 28%. In the case of implementation, the proportion of both INGOs and NNGOs involved have gone up respectively from 35% to 41% and from 38% to 47%. Interestingly the involvement of the UN has gone down as a percentage of the organisations involved. This implies that at the initial stage the international actors were more involved than national actors in humanitarian activities and UN played a greater role. Even the GoB performed a leading role in implementation at the initial period. However, the national NGOs have caught up over time, though the INGOs are still leading in activities and are dominant.

Figure 3: All Sectors





Figure 4 presents the statistics for the Child Protection sector. This shows that the relatively higher rate of increase in the number of NNGOs is not a general pattern and variations across sectors is possible. In the case of program partners the NNGOs have demonstrated a greater rate of increase. However, for implementation the proportion of NNGOs has decreased and the involvement of both INGOs and UN bodies has gone up.

Figure 4: Child Protection



The Education sector is represented in Figure 5. Here a greater role of NNGOs is clearly demonstrated. The education sector has experienced a high rate of new entrants i.e.

from 3 to 18 for program partners and from 7 to 21 for implementing partners. This increase is mainly due to the increase in the number of both INGOs and NNGOs, where the INGOs take the lead by 10 new entries for program partnership. For implementation, the NNGOs have higher involvement with the increase from 3 to 14.

Figure 5: Education




Figure 6 represents the Food Security sector which also has seen an increase in the number of organizations. It is however due to increased involvement of INGOs rather than the NNGOs.

Figure 6: Food Security





Figure 7 presents the Gender Based Violence sector. The Gender Based Violence sector experienced an increase of the number of both INGOs and NNGOS. Initially only the INGOs and UN bodies were involved as program partners. However, the report from 5th March shows 2 NNGOs as program partners. On the other hand, the number of NNGOs have gone up substantially as implementing partners.

Figure 7: Gender Based Violence



The Health sector is shown in Figure 8. This shows a greater involvement of INGOs in the initial stage of the crisis. The number of both program partners and implementing partners has gone up due to the entry of INGOs.

Figure 8: Health




Figure 9 shows NFI/Shelter sector. This sector has also seen an increase in both program and implementing partners. Involvement of both INGOs and NNGOs have gone up and they are almost in the same proportion.

Figure 9: NFI/Shelter






Figure 10 presents the Nutrition sector. Here there is increasing participation from both INGOs and NNGOs as the program and implementing partners, though this sector is clearly dominated by INGOs in the role of program partners.

Figure 10: Nutrition Sector




The protection sector is given in Figure 11. The number of organizations involved in this sector is very low. For program partners the total number of NGOs is only 4. For the implementing partners there are 8 organizations out of which 5 are NNGOs.

Figure 11: Protection Sector




The Site Management sector is shown in Figure 12. We observe opposite trends in the number of program and implementing partners. The numbers of program partners have gone down from 10 to 2, however the numbers of implementing partners have gone up from 10 to 46. We observe an increased involvement of both INGOs and NNGOs in implementation.

Figure 12: Site Management



The Wash sector is presented in Figure 13. In the Wash sector the numbers have gone up for both the program and implementing partners. The total number of program partners have gone up from 9 to 56 in which the involvement of the INGOs have gone up from 4 to 37 which shows the program partnership is dominated by INGOs. In case of implementing the NNGOs have a dominating role with the number increasing from 4 to 30 within the two reporting dates.

Figure 13: Wash Sector



To summarize, we observe a mixed picture of involvement of INGOs and NNGOs in the humanitarian activities. In some sectors we do see increased involvement of NNGOs however in other sectors the involvement of INGOs have gone up.

Returning to the question of localization, there is no clear overall evidence of increased involvement of national NGOs in the activities related to the Rohingya refugee crisis management. Though the issue of localization can be addressed in different ways, such as by looking at the proportion of activities managed by different types of NGOs, employment, coverage of areas, diversification of activities and other issues, our first look shows that localization of humanitarian operations has not been achieved in the context to the Rohingya refugee crisis.

7. Conclusion

The Rohingya refugee crisis is one of the largest humanitarian crisis to unfold in the last 5 years. Though the crisis itself has received international media coverage and attention of academics, little is known about the involvement of humanitarian agencies in the crisis management. This article has provided a first look at that the management of humanitarian

activities in relation to the present crisis. It also addressed the question of localization by examining the involvement of local humanitarian bodies through looking at the 4W data.

The analysis of data suggests that the humanitarian operations in relation to the Rohingya refugee crisis is yet to achieve localization as local organisations are still to assume leadership roles in the management of humanitarian activities.

In this context the importance of localization can be questioned. Refugee crises are a reality of recent times, and in many countries resulting in political tensions. Greater involvement of local institutions may provide a voice for the host communities thereby reducing tensions and allowing for peaceful cohabitation for both refugee and hosts. The importance of the involvement of local stakeholder in humanitarian management therefore cannot be ignored.

In addition, involving local institutions has potential to benefit the host countries in the form of human capital development. Providing humanitarian services is a specialist skill that requires training and experience. International humanitarian bodies have acquired these capabilities through decades long exposure to various crises. Increased involvement of local institutions can help transfer such skills to local institutions. This article suggests that the benefit of skill transfer is yet to be realized as the National NGOs still lag behind the International NGOs in participation.

This article also provides a comprehensive review of this history, context and literature of the management of humanitarian activities in relation to the Rohingya refugee crisis, and as such provides a point of departure for future research. In addition, the names of institutions and the evolution of humanitarian activities have been documented. We expect that the future research and related practices will find our endeavor useful in the management and understanding of humanitarian crises.

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Appendix

Table 2A: List of agencies involved in humanitarian operations

Full name	Type	Religion based entity (Yes/No)	Which religion
Action Aid Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
Association for Aid and Relief	INGO	No	
Action Contre La Faim/Action Against Hunger	INGO	No	
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development	INGO	No	
ACT Alliance	INGO	Yes	Christian
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	INGO	Yes	Christian
Association of Training and Development Support	NNGO	No	
Allama Fazlulla Foundation	NNGO	No	
Agrajattra	NNGO	No	
Almanahill	NNGO	No	
AMURT Disaster Relief - Development Cooperation	NNGO	No	
ANANDO	NNGO	No	
An Organization for Socio-Economic Development	INGO	No	
Asia Pacific Developemnt Center for Disability	INGO	No	
Association for Socio Economic Advancement in Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
AWO International	INGO	No	
Initiative for People's Self Development	NNGO	No	
Bangladesh Development Research Center	NNGO	No	
Bangladesh Red Crescent Society	NNGO	No	
Bangla German Sempreeti	NNGO	No	
Bangladesh Institute of Theatre Arts	NNGO	No	
Bangla Mission	NNGO	No	
Bank Negara Malaysia	INGO	No	
Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers Association	NNGO	No	
BRAC	NNGO	No	
British Red Cross	INGO	No	
Christian Aid	INGO	No	Christian
Care Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
Caritas	INGO	Yes	Christian

Christian Blind Mission	INGO	Yes	Christian
Christian Commission for the Development of Bangladesh	NNGO	Yes	Christian
Center for Disability in Development	INGO	No	
Center for Natural Resource Studies	NNGO	No	
Coastal Association for Social Transformation Trust	NNGO	No	
CODEC	NNGO	No	
Compassion International	INGO	Yes	Christian
COTE	INGO	No	
Common Pipeline	INGO	No	
Community Partners International	INGO	No	
Child Right Connect	INGO	No	
Concern Worldwide	INGO	No	
Center for Zakat Management	NNGO	Yes	Muslim
Dalit – Hope for the Oppressed	NNGO	No	
Dhaka Ahsania Misson	NNGO	Yes	Muslim
DanChurchAid	INGO	Yes	Christian
Dhaka Community Hospital Trust	NNGO	No	
Dortmunder helfen Kurden	INGO	No	
DLANAT	INGO	No	
Department of Agricultural Extension	GoB	No	
Department of Fisheries	GoB	No	
DoPeace	INGO	No	
Department of Public Health Engineering	GoB	No	
Danish Refugee Council	INGO	No	
Development Support Center	INGO	No	
Dushtha Shasthya Kendra	NNGO	No	
Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman	Others	No	
Eco Social Development Organization	NNGO	No	
Food and Agriculture Organization	UN	No	
Finn Church Aid	INGO	Yes	Christian
Family Development Services Research	NNGO	No	
Food for the Hungry	NNGO	No	
Field Hospital Malaysia	INGO	No	
Friends in Village Development Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
Friendship	INGO	No	
Global Action for Children	INGO	No	
Give2Asia	INGO	No	
Gonoshasthaya Kendra	NNGO	No	
GlobalOne	NNGO	No	
Gender Resource Centre	NNGO	No	
Gana Unnayan Kendra	NNGO	No	
GUSS	NNGO	No	

Health and Education for All	INGO	No	
Health and Education for the Less Privileged People	NNGO		
Help - Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe	INGO	No	
HelpAge International	INGO	No	
Hope Foundation	INGO	No	
Helping Hand for Relief and Development	INGO	Yes	Muslim
Handicap International	INGO	No	
Hindu Family	NNGO	Yes	Hindu
HOPE Foundation for Woman and Children of Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
HELVETAS	INGO	No	
Humaniterra International	INGO	No	
HYSAWA Project	NNGO	No	
Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation	INGO	Yes	Christian
ICNA Relief Canada	INGO	Yes	Muslim
International Committee of the Red Cross	INGO	No	
Integrated Development Foundation	INGO	No	
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	INGO	No	
Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance	INGO	Yes	Muslim
Humanitarian Relief Foundation	INGO	Yes	Muslim
Infinity	INGO	No	
International Organization for Migration	UN	No	
International Rescue Committee	INGO	No	
Integrated Social Development Effort Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
International Union for Conservation of Nature	INGO	No	
International Volunteers of Yamagata	INGO	No	
Jagorani Chakra Foundation	NNGO	No	
Japanese Red Cross Society	INGO	No	
Kindernothilfe	INGO	Yes	Christian
KUWAIT SOCIETY FOR RELIEF	INGO	Yes	Muslim
Marcy Without Limit	INGO	No	
Médecins du Monde	INGO	No	
Medair	INGO	Yes	Christian
MedGlobal	INGO	No	
Mercy Malaysia	INGO	Yes	Muslim
Muslim Hands International	INGO	Yes	Muslim
Malteser International	INGO	No	
Migrant Offshore Aid Station	INGO	No	
Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief	GoB	No	
Médecins Sans Frontières	INGO	No	

Medical Teams International	INGO	No	
Mukti Cox's Bazar	NNGO	No	
National Association	NNGO	No	
NF Enterprise	NNGO	No	
Nobolok	NNGO	No	
NGO Forum for Public Health	NNGO	No	
OBAT Helpers	INGO	No	
One Nation	INGO	No	
Oxfam	INGO	No	
Practical Action	NNGO		
Programme for Helpless and Lagged Societies	NNGO	No	
Partners in Health Development	INGO	No	
People in Need	INGO	No	
Plan	INGO	No	
Prantic	NNGO	No	
Protyashi	NNGO	No	
Première Urgence Internationale	INGO	No	
PULSE Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
Peace Winds Japan	INGO	No	
Qatar Charity	INGO	No	
Qatar Red Crescent	INGO	No	
Reach Initiative	INGO	No	
Refugee Health Unit	GoB	No	
Relief International	INGO	No	
Resource Integration Centre	NNGO	No	
RISDA Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
Research, Training & Management International	NNGO	No	
SALT Financial Literacy International	NNGO	No	
Syrian American Medical Society	INGO	No	
Social Assistance and Rehabilitation for Physically Vulnerable	NNGO	No	
Save the Children	INGO	No	
Society for Health Extension and Development	NNGO	No	
Solidarités International	INGO	No	
Secours Islamique France	INGO	Yes	Muslim
Small Kindness Bangladesh	NNGO	No	
Samaj Kallyan O Unnayan Shangstha	NNGO	No	
Site Management Engineering Project	Consortium/Other s	No	
Sheba Manab Kallyan Kendra	NNGO	No	
Samaritan's Purse	INGO	Yes	Christian
Society for People's Actions in Change and Equity	NNGO	No	

Swiss Red Cross	INGO	No	
Sushilan	NNGO	No	
Technical Assistance Inc.	NNGO	No	
Terre des Hommes	INGO	No	
Tearfund	INGO	Yes	Christian
Tanzania Red Cross Society	INGO	No	
United Nations Development Programme	UN	No	
United Nations Population Fund	UN	No	
United Nations High Commission for Refugees	UN	No	
UNICEF	UN	No	
United Sikhs	NNGO	Yes	Sikhs
UNWOMEN	UN	No	
United Purpose	INGO	No	
Ummah Welfare Trust	INGO	Yes	Muslim
Village Education Resource Center	NNGO	No	
Voluntary Service Overseas	INGO	No	
Water Aid	INGO	No	
World Concern	INGO	No	
United Nations World Food Programme	UN	No	
Welthungerhilfe (WHH)	INGO	No	
World Vision International	INGO	Yes	Christian
Young Power in Social Action	NNGO	No	

Source: 4W spreadsheet of UNOCHA. Information on religion is obtained from the webpages of organizations